

Economic and non-economic determinants of attitudes towards immigrants in Thailand
Rachael KAWASAKI and Yuichi IKEDA

Abstract: This study uses survey data from the 2013 World Values Survey in Thailand to examine the economic and non-economic determinants of attitudes towards immigrants in a newly industrialized, non-Western country. Using a novel method of selecting non-economic variables, this model improves on previous models of attitudes towards immigrants. In contrast to previous research, individual skill level was not found to be significant in determining attitudes towards immigrants, suggesting that previous research may have been overbiased towards developed countries. Rather, non-economic variables were found to be very significant in determining respondents' attitudes. These variables include perceived threat and group identification, institutional trust, beliefs about individual agency, and adherence to norms and tradition. Future research will extend the study to include up to 60 countries, allowing for a community analysis which fully delineates the different determinants of attitudes towards immigrants globally.

1. Introduction

International migration is a growing global phenomenon, both in sheer numbers and scope of sending and receiving countries. While migration has always figured in human history, today immigration has led publics and governments to critically reexamine who belongs, what rights are to be guaranteed, and how different religions, ethnicities, and cultures can coexist. In Europe, it is clear that attitudes towards immigrants and immigration have taken an organizing role in populist party platforms, but what is not clear is why (Lesinska, 2014). Theories generally cite three possible causes: economic competition, cultural backlash, and political demography (Dennison, 2019), but theoretical gaps remain. Notably, when do economic considerations, such as immigration's effect on the labor market or the government's fiscal burden, take precedence over an individual's cultural preferences?

Understanding the determinants of attitudes towards immigrants and immigration is essential for creating favorable and effective economic and social policies. When economic factors are dominant in determining people's attitudes towards immigrants and immigration, attitudes can be an indirect measure of the distributional effects of immigration and help identify those who are being economically harmed by immigration. If attitudes towards immigrants are determined by cultural or individual factors, policymakers may instead elect to choose a public information campaign or reexamine their immigrant integration policies. Finally, attitudes towards immigrants have a profound impact on immigrants, including their social and economic integration (Constant et al., 2009) and physical and mental health (Pernice and Brook, 1996; Gee et al., 2007; Agudelo-Suarez et al., 2009). Discriminatory practices against immigrants undermine the rule of law, waste human capital, and can lead to societal tension. Countering these practices and ensuring the rights of immigrants in a destination country should be of equal importance to policymakers.

One of the most glaring gaps in the research on attitudes towards immigrants and immigration is the overrepresentation of developed, Western countries.¹ Research tends to focus on the movement of international migrants from less developed countries to developed countries, from non-Western countries to Western countries. While high-income countries

¹ Here, "Western countries" is intended to mean European countries and settler countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States). Overall, the majority of cross-national studies focus on these countries (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010).

remain some of the most popular destinations for immigrants in the world, the percentage of international migrants living in the less developed countries is sizable, at around 43 percent or 112 million people (UN DESA, 2017). Furthermore, the regional destinations of immigrants are changing. From 2000 to 2017, Asia added more international migrants than any other region as well as experiencing the largest percent growth. The total migrants in the region increased by 60 percent (UN DESA, 2017). Despite these changes, studies on attitudes towards immigrants and immigration often assume a Western cultural and political context, rendering a full, cross-cultural understanding of attitudes towards immigrants as incomplete.

This study aims to remedy this oversight by modeling the determinants of attitudes towards immigrants in Thailand, a non-Western, newly industrialized country. In 2017, Thailand hosted the 17th largest number of international migrants in the world, with an estimated 3.6 million international migrants residing in its borders (UN DESA, 2017). Like many of the European countries studied, large-scale migration to Thailand began in the post-war period and includes both economic migrants and refugees fleeing persecution. Migrants also tend to be low-skilled, generally employed in manufacturing, construction, agricultural, fishing and seafood processing, and domestic work (IOM, 2019). However, in other aspects, Thailand and its migration flow differ dramatically from the countries generally studied in research on attitudes towards immigrants. First, it is a constitutional monarchy with a political system dissimilar to the liberal democracies usually surveyed. Furthermore, it is a newly industrialized country, having reached upper middle income status in 2011. Finally, while Western countries generally have a mix of migrants from both developed and less developed countries, the vast majority of Thailand's international immigrants come from the less developed, surrounding Mekong countries. Thus, migrants and natives often share the same religion and race, though historic animosities remain.

By comparing the determinants of attitudes towards immigrants in Thailand to the previous research, this study corroborates some of the dominant theories of how attitudes are formed, namely intergroup conflict theory. However, this study's findings also contradict several previously established patterns. The finding that educational attainment is dominant in determining attitudes, suggesting that the extent to which education affects people's attitudes towards immigrants may be culturally or regionally dependent. Determinants related to institutional confidence also show results that seem to be contrary to trends in Western countries. Finally, this paper contributes new insights into how beliefs about agency and control can be salient determinants of attitudes. This model represents an overall improvement in terms of fit as compared to previous cross-national models.

2. Literature Review

Studies have found various key factors in determining individuals' attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. On the individual-level, determinants of attitudes can be split into economic and non-economic variables. The overall economic and political situation have also found to have an effect on individuals' attitudes. In general, most studies conclude that these factors work in concert to determine an individuals' attitude towards immigrants.

For economic factors, the highest education attained is often used to measure the individual's skill level. Education has been shown to have a strong, inverse relationship with anti-immigration views (Mayda, 2006; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Dustmann and Preston, 2006). Lancee and Sarrasin describe the relationship between education and more inclusive attitudes towards immigrants and immigration as "one of the, if not *the*, strongest and most consistent predictor of host country citizens' attitudes towards immigrants" (Lancee and Sarrasin, 2015, pp. 1). According to Mayda, Scheve and Slaughter, and Dustmann and Preston, education measures the skill level of the respondent and can, thus, be compared to the skill level of immigrants to determine whether or not the respondent is in labor market

competition with immigrants.² For this reason, tertiary-educated individuals in European and settler countries are rarely in competition with the majority of immigrants and, therefore, have more positive attitudes towards immigrants. Mayda (2006) finds that while both economic and non-economic factors are significant in determining people's attitudes, economic factors have a larger effect on people's attitudes in the nearly 44 countries surveyed.

Another economic factor believed to have an effect on individuals' attitudes towards immigrants is the perceived effect of immigration on fiscal burden. Between countries, the public in countries with more comprehensive welfare systems was found to have a more inclusive attitude towards immigrants and immigration (Crepaz and Damron, 2009; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). On the individual level, respondents who are at greater risk for tax increases are more likely to have negative attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. In this case, these individuals are natives with higher incomes in states with more a more generous social safety net (Hanson et al., 2007). As such, there could be a balancing effect between labor market competition and a rise in taxes, as higher income and higher skilled individuals are less likely to be in competition but more likely to pay through higher taxes (Hanson et al., 2007).

While models may find that economic factors are dominant, a number of non-economic factors are often found to contribute to individuals' attitudes towards immigrants. First, a higher value on cultural homogeneity are correlated with more negative attitudes towards immigrants (Sides and Citrin, 2007; Mayda, 2006). While others may see immigration as a way to enrich the national culture, other respondents find it a threat to the cultural identity of the country. Those respondents who are more likely to identify as being on the political right were also more likely to have negative attitudes towards immigrants and immigration (Mayda 2006; Malchow-Møller and Skaksen, 2008). People who identify as religious are more likely to have more inclusive attitudes towards immigrants and immigration (Daniels and Von Der Ruhr, 2003). Finally, demographic factors have been found to be related to attitudes towards immigration, such as age, gender, and whether the respondent lives in a rural or urban area (Mayda, 2006; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2009; Quillian, 1995).

Intergroup conflict theory can help explain both the economic and non-economic factors which determine attitudes towards immigrants (Campbell, 1965; Sherif, 1966; LeVine and Campbell, 1972). Group theory posits "that prejudice and discrimination are often based on conflicts of interest between groups" (Esses et al., 1998). Group conflict can be separated into perceived threats to material or symbolic resources. In the case of realistic group conflict, group conflicts occur over real competition over scarce resources, for example, over a limited amount of employment for certain groups. In contrast, social identity theory states that individuals categorize other into either outgroup (those who are different from themselves) and ingroup (themselves and those who are similar to them). Limiting the opportunities of those in the outgroup becomes one strategy to increase the distinctiveness and cohesion of the ingroup (Esses et al., 1998). Thus, through exclusion of members of the outgroup, the ingroup can fend off perceived threats to their symbolic resources, in this case the positive identity gained from the group. Therefore, those who identify more heavily with a group are likely to have more hostile feelings towards outgroups. And last, it is important to note that group conflict is caused by a *perceived* threat to one's group. While in the case of realistic group theory this threat is true, a threat does not have to be realistic in order to cause conflict, and individuals more sensitive to threat should have stronger reactions.

² Some scholars, however, dispute the use of education as a measurement of skill and only skill, arguing that education is too highly correlated with cultural values that can also determine attitudes towards immigrants, e.g. reduced authoritarianism (Hello et al., 2007) and an emphasis on cultural diversity (Davidov and Meuleman, 2012).

3. Methodology

Data for this study was taken from the World Values Survey Wave Six conducted in Thailand in 2013. A total of 1200 people were randomly surveyed. Because few immigrants were surveyed (around 1 percent of the sample), immigrants and the children of immigrants were eliminated from the sample. The dependent variable is derived from the following question:

V46. When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people of this country over immigrants.

[1] Agree

[0] Neither *originally coded [2]

[0] Disagree *originally coded [3]

Respondents who had protectionist views were coded as 1, and those with more inclusive views or uncertain views were coded as 0. Protectionist, in this case, is used to mean the view that the domestic labor market should be protected from foreign competition in the form of migrants. This usage is not common and is used here because of its expediency. While the question involves considerations about the economic impact of immigration, it asks whether “employers” and not the government should intervene in hiring immigrants. As such, this dependent variable does not measure attitudes towards immigration and immigration policy, but rather attitudes towards immigrants and the acceptability of employment discrimination against them (see Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010). Mayda’s model used a different dependent variable, which measured people’s attitudes towards immigration policy; however, this question was retired from subsequent World Values Survey waves. Overall, amongst the 1120 native respondents, 62.9 percent held protectionist views with regards to employing immigrants.

Demographic variables were chosen according to Mayda’s (2006) model. The economic variable used was highest education attained. This variable was chosen because it is a proxy for skill level and, thus, determines whether or not respondents are in economic competition with the mostly low-skilled immigrants to Thailand. While the World Values Survey asked questions related to income and social class, these variables were included as demographic factors instead of economic factors because they require the respondent to situate themselves within the larger society. For example, question 239 asks “On this card is an income scale on which 1 indicates the lowest income group and 10 the highest income group in your country. We would like to know in what group your household is.” This question asks a subjective question, one which asks the respondent to imagine the society as a whole and where they might be located. As a result, highest education was chosen as the economic variable because it is an empirical measure of skill.

Finally, non-economic variables were chosen according to the following method. First, Spearman’s correlation was employed between the variables to find variables that were highly correlated (rho greater than or equal to absolute value of 0.75). Then the variables were regressed against the dependent immigrant variable. Of the correlated variables, those with the lowest AIC were selected while the others were eliminated. As a result, 9 variables were eliminated, leaving 158 non-economic variables. Following this step, a chi-squared test was performed to show the correlation between each variable and the immigrant dependent variable. Only the variables that were significant at the 5% level were selected, as these showed that there was an unequal distribution of the responses to the variable question and the immigrant dependent variable. Continuous variables were then regressed against the proportion who felt that employers should discriminate against immigrants during tough economic conditions. The purpose of this step was to ascertain which variables showed a clear trend on how people answered the dependent variable. Continuous variables were

variables with four or more possible responses, as these questions were ordinal. From this step, 80 variables were eliminated. As a result, a total of 29 continuous variables and 25 non-continuous variables were selected for multiple logistic regression. By using this method, non-economic variables with a clear relationship with the dependent variable could be found, even if they were not commonly associated with attitudes towards immigrants in previous literature.

Table 1. Method of selecting non-economic variables

1. Eliminate demographic and economic variables [167 variables]
2. Spearman's correlation [158 variables]
3. Chi-squared test [134 variables]
4. Continuous variables [109 variables]
a. Linear regression [29 variables]
5. Selected non-economic variables [54 variables]

Using the selected non-economic variables, the economic variable, and the demographic factors, multiple logistic regression was employed. Insignificant variables were eliminated until all variables were significant.

4. Results

Table 2. Results of multiple logistic regression

term	estimate	std.error	statistic	p.value	
		0.6819933			***
<i>(Intercept)</i>	4.7476415	3	6.9614193	3.37E-12	
		0.2118710			***
<i>factor(jobindp)2</i>	-1.5133172	3	-7.142634	9.16E-13	
<i>factor(jobindp)3</i>	-2.0988062	0.2397346	-8.7547072	2.05E-18	***
<i>factor(fightforcountry)</i>		0.2848247	2.4619773	0.0138173	*
<i>1</i>	0.7012321	6	1	4	
	0.5412021	0.1899225			**
<i>factor(rceremonies)1</i>	3	3	2.8495942	0.0043775	
		0.0419486			***
<i>CONTROL</i>	0.1658165	8	3.9528417	7.72E-05	
		0.0852950		0.0007815	***
<i>Ssecurity</i>	-0.2865268	2	-3.3592444	6	
		0.0374589		0.0002834	***
<i>HARDWORK</i>	-0.1359758	9	-3.6299913	3	
		0.1011319			***
<i>CONCOURT</i>	-0.4184168	4	-4.1373362	3.51E-05	
		0.1460163		0.0057262	**
<i>DEMOPOLI</i>	-0.4034519	9	-2.7630587	5	
		0.0843580		0.0002697	***
<i>EDUWRY</i>	-0.3072919	1	-3.6427111	8	
		0.1259824			***
<i>dclass</i>	-0.6010312	1	-4.7707547	1.84E-06	
Null deviance: 1194.10 on 918 degrees of freedom					
Residual deviance: 785.45 on 907 degrees of freedom					
AIC: 809.45					

BIC: 867.3312
Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 5
Number of observations: 919
Pseudo R ² : 0.34
*Significant at 0.05%; **Significant at 0.01%, ***Significant at 0.001%

Table 3. Significant variables – question, response coding, and interpretation

Variable	Question	Response	Interpretation
jobindp	V48. Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person.	Agree [1] Neither [2] Disagree [3]	People who disagree or choose neither decrease the log odds of having protectionist views by -1.51 and -2.10
fightforcountry*	V66. Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?	Yes [1] No [0]	People who were willing to fight for their country increase the log odds of having protectionist views by 0.70
rceremonies	V150. With which one of the following statements do you agree most? The basic meaning of religion is:	To follow religious norms and ceremonies [1] To do good to other people [0]	People who believed religion was about following norms and ceremonies increased the log odds of having protectionist views by 0.54
CONTROL	Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means "no choice at all" and 10 means "a great deal of choice" to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out	No choice at all [1] A great deal of choice [10]	People who feel that they have greater choice and control in what happens to them increased the log odds of having protectionist views by 0.17
Ssecurity	V72. Living in secure surroundings is important to this person; to avoid anything that might be dangerous.	Very much like me [1] Like me [2] Somewhat like me [3]	People for whom secure surroundings were less important had less protectionist views by -0.29

		A little like me [4] Not like me [5] Not at all like me [6]	
HARDWORK	V100.	In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life [1] Hard work doesn't generally bring success - it's more a matter of luck and connections [10]	People who did not believe hard work brought success decreased their log odds of having protectionist views by -0.14
CONCOURT	Could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: V114. The courts	A great deal [1] Quite a lot [2] Not very much [3] None at all [4]	People who had less confidence in the courts decreased the log odds of having protectionist views by -0.42
DEMOPOLI	For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? V130. Having a democratic political system	Very good [1] Fairly good [2] Fairly bad [3] Very bad [4]	People who believed a democratic political system was a bad system decreased the log odds of having protectionist views by -.40
EDUWRY	To what degree are you worried about the following situations? V182. Not being able to give my children a good education	Very much [1] A good deal [2] Not much [3] Not at all [4]	People who were less worried about providing a good edu for their children decreased the log odds of having protectionist views by -0.31
dclass*	V238. People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the:	Upper class [1] Upper middle class [2] Lower middle class [3] Working class [4] Lower class [5]	People who were lower class decreased the log odds of having protectionist views

*Also significant in Mayda's (2006) model.

5. Discussion

Overall, the model shows significant improvement from previous research in terms of fit. When Mayda's model is applied only to Thailand, the model has a pseudo r-squared of about 20.6 percent. The r-squared for this model shows a 13.6 percentage point increase in the fit of the model, at 34.2 percent. This finding shows that the methodology used to find the determinants of protectionist views of the labor market is robust and an improvement on previous methods using social survey data.

In contrast to previous models, the economic variable (highest education attained) was not found to be significant. While multi-country studies generally find that higher education attainment is correlated with more inclusive views towards immigrants, this trend does not remain true when applied to just Thailand. This finding reveals one of the problems with multi-country studies, which is that they can obscure differences between countries. In their review of cross-national studies of attitudes towards immigrants, Ceobanu and Escandell describe the inverse relationship between education and more inclusive attitudes towards immigrants as "a remarkably consistent finding" (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010, pp. 319). However, these studies covered only developed countries and almost exclusively Western countries (Japan and Korea were included in some studies). Mayda's study, which included more developing countries, had a relatively low r-squared overall, at 6%. When she limited the study to only the developed countries included in the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), this r-square increased substantially to 20%. These findings as well as the finding that education was not significant in the case of Thailand support the theory that education may be more influential in Western, developed countries but not in others. While previous research has found that education is very significant in determining attitudes, this does not appear to be the case in Thailand, suggesting that an overrepresentation of Western, developed country had led to an overemphasis on education in determining people's attitudes.

Though highest education was not found to be significant, subjective social class was found to have a significant relationship with protectionist views. People who identify as lower social classes are less likely to have protectionist views. Social class differs from the economic variable of highest education attained, as it encompasses both economic standing and social determinations, like prestige and status. Interestingly, this finding contradicts previous research which finds that people who are in competition with immigrants – in the case of Thailand, these are individuals with lower skill levels and lower economic standing – should have less favorable attitudes towards immigrants. The data here shows the opposite is true in Thailand. Rather, those with economic situations more similar to that of migrants appear to have less protectionist views towards immigrants in the labor market. This finding suggests that current conceptions of realistic group conflict with respect to immigrants and natives in the labor market may be limited in their scope, or that other, more salient group conflicts may be at play.

The significant non-economic variables can be broadly organized into four major determinants of people's attitudes towards immigrants, based on which sociological or economic theory aids in their interpretation. The first is group identification and perceived threat, both economic and social. This determinant means that people who more strongly identify as part of a group will have more negative attitudes towards people outside of this group. Likewise, people who feel more threatened or insecure in their livelihood will more intensely identify with their ingroup to the detriment of the outgroup. While this determinant could be considered two separate determinants, they are combined here because of this relationship. Importantly, this phenomenon occurs because of the perception of threat and can therefore vary amongst individuals even within the same socioeconomic class.

People who showed greater national pride, i.e. those who were willing to fight for their country if there was a war, showed more protectionist views, which is consistent with Mayda's findings. Individuals who were more worried about providing their children with a

good education were found to have more protectionist views, consistent with the theory that feelings of threat and insecurity intensify out-group rejection. Furthermore, respondents who put a greater value on security were also more likely to have protectionist views. These findings suggest that feelings of threat, insecurity, and aversion to risk do indeed lead to greater rejection of outgroup members and a prioritization of ingroup members.

The second determinant is institutional confidence. Overall, those with less institutional confidence are found to have less protectionist views. This finding is especially important because it is specific to Thailand's unique history and political system. It is easy to imagine that in another country, less institutional trust could be related to more protectionist views. Those with less confidence in the courts were found to have less protectionist views. Respondents who felt that a democratic political system was a bad way of governing the country were also less likely to have protectionist views.

In order to understand this result, it is important to keep in mind several key facts. First, the data shows a large skew, with 93.8 percent of respondents stating that a democratic political system is a very good or fairly good way to govern the country. Secondly, Thailand is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system. However, the Kingdom's democracy is turbulent, having experienced 12 successful coups since the implementation of the first constitution in 1932. Civil liberties are at times curtailed, often falling short of what some consider essential to democracies, such as freedom of the press, the existence of very strict *lèse-majesté* laws and tightly controlled elections. A democratic system has historically been tied to other imperatives and political institutions, such as development, modernization, and the monarchy itself. Therefore, the meaning of democracy within Thailand is unique to its political history and more contested than in other countries. Finally, the timing of this survey is incredibly important as it was conducted in 2012, only a year before Thailand's most recent coup and the installment of the military junta. Thus, a precise definition of what respondents consider democracy is nearly impossible to manage. With the available data and understanding that definitions of democracy may vary widely amongst respondents, individuals who felt that democracy was a bad way of governing the country are rejecting the normative political system promoted by the state. Thus, less confidence in a democratic political system signals a greater lack of trust in the institutions upheld at least nominally by the government. Both of these variables show the same trend, namely that less trust in institutions was correlated with more inclusive attitudes towards immigrants.

This finding shows a stark difference with the research conducted in Europe. In a cross-national study of European countries, higher institutional trust was found to be correlated with more inclusive attitudes towards immigrants (Halapuu et al., 2013). A similar, single country study found the same trend in England (Andreescu, 2011). This finding highlights how determinants of attitudes towards immigrants are heavily context and country dependent. While one trend may hold true in the countries most commonly studied, further investigation in a country with a very different political and social context show how this pattern can be easily reversed.

The third group of variables found in the model relates to agency. People who expressed the view that people have a large amount of control over their futures were more likely to have protectionist views. Variables related to hard work and agency can be grouped together into this third determinant. Respondents who felt that success in life was more a product of luck and connections rather than their own efforts were less likely to have protectionist views towards immigrants in the labor market. Similarly, respondents who felt less choice and control in how their lives turned out also had less protectionist views towards immigrants. This finding is reinforced by the fact that both variables trend in the same direction, with feelings of less control relating to less protectionist views.

Finally, the final variable, following norms, is less clear and more difficult to interpret. Respondents who felt that religion's main purpose was to follow norms and ceremonies rather than to do good to other people were more likely to have protectionist views. In this case, the question is clear that the importance of following norms for their sake rather than for their effects has a clear relationship with attitudes towards immigrants. Respondents who disagreed that a job was the best way for women to become independent were more likely to have protectionist views. This question is difficult to interpret precisely as the respondents' attitudes towards female independence, the value of independence itself, and what avenues besides labor are better for female independence, are not revealed through this question. However, Kuasirikun describes Thai culture as "fundamentally patriarchal" (Kuasirikun, 2011, pp. 57); traditional roles for women are subordinate to men and circumscribed by the household and private sphere.³ As such, women's labor is traditionally configured as remaining within the household (Coyle & Kwong, 2000), and the view that women should work outside the home is contrary to traditional norms. Thus, these two questions can be categorized as subscription to traditional, normative views. Both find a positive relationship between traditional views and protectionist views against immigrants.

6. Conclusion

In conclusion, this model for the determinants of attitudes towards immigrants in Thailand found four overarching categories: group identification and perceived threat, institutional confidence, agency, and adherence to traditional norms. Results for questions related to perceived threat and outgroup rejection remained consistent with current theories, showing an positive relationship between greater identification and greater perceived threat with more protectionist views. Institutional confidence had an inverse relationship with protectionist views, a pattern determined by Thailand's unique political history and contrary to previous findings. Feelings of greater agency and greater adherence to traditional values were also positively related with protectionist views.

This model represents an improvement upon previous models in terms of fit. Furthermore, it highlights some of the shortcomings in multi-country studies which use the same set of variables for varied cultures and which cover almost exclusively Western societies. Educational attainment, usually a highly determinant factor, was not found to be significant. Rather, social class was found to be significant and showed that people who identified as lower classes were more likely to have inclusive views towards immigrants. This finding implies that intergroup conflict theories when applied to immigration and integration may need to consider the wider context and salience of intergroup conflicts in the country.

In order to fully understand the findings of this study, future research will expand to include more countries and perform community analysis of the determinants of attitudes towards immigrants for each country. Such an analysis will allow the differences between

³ The role of women in the private and public sphere has not been static in Thailand and is influenced by various factors. First, the value of women's labor and their role outside of the household depends in part on the woman's socio-economic status and other compounding factors. Industrialization and increased migration from the country to the city have changed the division of labor between men and women has also changed dramatically in Thai society, with women often losing ground in the public sphere as work and the home became more separated (Buranajaroenkij, 2017). Traditional institutions in Thai society also have an influence on the gender roles for women. In Thai Buddhism, women are not able to become monks and must acquire merit "vicariously" through their sons becoming monks. Women are often portrayed as "contaminants" and 'temptresses' standing in the way of men's deliverance from materialism" (Coyle & Kwong, 2000, pp. 496). Finally, the Thai government during modernization after World War II propagating the image of the ideal Thai woman as "who maintains the values and traditions of the family and the country and fulfills the role of the good mother and wife" (Buranajaroenkij, 2017, pp. 3), which primarily confined women to the household.

countries to become more clear and represent a significant improvement on models which currently assume a more isomorphic cultural and political context. Finally, future research aims to present a full comparison amongst countries, answering questions such as under what conditions is education an important determining factor, when is institutional trust positively correlated with protectionist attitudes towards immigrants and when is it correlated with inclusive attitudes, and whether non-economic factors like agency, tradition, and women's labor show a similar effect across countries.

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